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Abstract—This paper discusses about the honeypot, which 
serves as advanced security tool minimizing the risks from 
attack on IT and networks. The methods deployed to show 
the working of honeypots are discussed in this paper along 
with advantage and disadvantages of honeypot. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, Honeypots are still in their infancy, developed and 
used primarily by researchers and security personnel’s. A 
handful of commercial products are available, and 
organizations are beginning to deploy open-source 
honeypots and their more robust iterations, such as 
Honeyed. But honeypots are not widely deployed. 
It is said that “In the near future, honeypots will "learn" 
your network on their own and dynamically configure 
themselves”. Yet, honey pot technology is moving ahead 
rapidly, and, in a year or two, honeypots will be hard to 
ignore. New developments will advance the lab technology 
with the catchy name to a full-fledged, enterprise-level 
security tool. 
Honey Pot Systems are defined as trap servers or systems, 
setup to gather information regarding an attacker or intruder 
into your system. Honeypots can be termed as additional 
internet security systems and they are an additional level  
or system. Honey Pots can be setup inside, outside or in the 
DMZ (demilitarized zone) of a firewall design or even in all 
of the locations although they are most often deployed 
inside of a firewall for control purposes [1]. Honeypots are 
variants of standard Intruder Detection Systems (IDS) but 
with more of a focus on information gathering and 
deception.  
 
Fig.1: Honeypots installed in Internet Security system. 
An example of a Honey Pot systems installed in a 
traditional Internet security design is shown in Figure 1. 
Honey Pot system is setup to be easier prey for intruders but 
with minor system modifications so that their activity can 
be logged of traced. The general thought is that once an 
intruder breaks into a system, they will come back for 
subsequent visits. During these subsequent visits, additional 
information can be gathered and additional attempts at file, 
security and system access on the Honey can be monitored 
and saved[3]. A honey pot is a system that's put on a 
network so it can be probed and attacked. Because the 
honeypot has no production value, there is no "legitimate" 
use for it. This means that any interaction with the 
honeypot, such as a probe or a scan, is by definition 
suspicious.There are two types of honeypots:  
• Research: Most attention to date has focused on 
research honeypots, which are used to gather 
information about the actions of intruders. For 
example, the Honey net Project is a volunteer, 
nonprofit security research organization that uses 
honeypots to collect information on cyber threats. 
• Production: Less attention has been paid to 
production honeypots, which are actually used to 
protect organizations. Increasingly, however, 
production honeypots are being recognized for the 
detection capabilities they can provide and for the 
ways they can supplement both network- and host-
based intrusion protection. 
Why to set up Honey pot? 
To learn how intruders probe and attempt to gain access to 
your systems. The general idea is that since a record of the 
intruder’s activities is kept, you can gain insight into attack 
methodologies to better protect your real production 
systems.  
Gather forensic information required to aid in the 
apprehension or prosecution of intruders. This is the sort of 
information often needed to provide law enforcement 
officials with the details needed to prosecute. 
How to track intruder using Honeypots: 
The information provided on an intruder depends on the 
levels of tracking that you’ve enabled on your Honey Pot. 
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Common tracking levels include the firewall, system logs 
on the Honey Pot and sniffer-based tools.  
Firewall Logs 
Firewalls are useful as part of the overall Honey Pot design 
for many reasons. Most fir`ewalls provide activity-logging 
capabilities which can be used to identify how an intruder is 
attempting to get into a Honey Pot. I liken firewall logs to 
router logs; they can both be set to trap and save packets of 
a pre-determined type. Remember that when setting up the 
firewall, you would normally want to log ALL packets 
going to the Honey Pot system, as there should be no 
legitimate reason for traffic going to or from the Honey Pot.  
Reviewing the order, sequence, time stamps and type of 
packets used by an intruder to gain access to you Honey Pot 
will help you identify the tools, methodology being used by 
the intruder and their intentions (vandalism, data theft, 
remote launch point search, etc.). Depending on the detail 
capabilities of logging on your firewall you may or not be 
able to gain considerable information from these logs.  
 
Another useful function of many firewalls is their 
notification capabilities. Most firewalls can be configured to 
send alerts by email or pager to notify you of traffic going 
to or from your Honey Pot. This can be extremely useful in 
letting you review intruder activity WHILE it’s happening.  
System Logs 
UNIX and Microsoft NT seem to have the lion share of the 
Internet server markets. Luckily, both operating systems 
have logging capabilities built into their operating systems, 
which help identify what changes or attempts have been 
made. It should be noted that out-of-the box, Unix offers 
superior logging capabilities as compared to Microsoft NT.  
Some of their out-of-the box logging capabilities include:  
• Microsoft NT  
 Security – Available from Event Viewer  
 User Management – Needs to be enabled 
through User Manager  
 Running Services – Netsvc.exe needs to be 
manually run and compared to baseline.  
• Unix  
 User activity logs – utmp, wtmp, btmp, 
lastlog, messages  
 Syslogd – An important option is that it can 
log to a remote server! The range of facilities 
and priorities available through syslogd is very 
good.  
There are also several tools available that greatly increase 
the information that can be gathered. Many of the UNIX 
tools are public domain, while many of the Microsoft NT 
tools are not.  
Sniffer Tools 
Sniffer tools provide the capability of seeing all of the 
information or packets going between the firewall and the 
Honey Pot system. Most of the sniffers available are 
capable of decoding common tcp packets such as Telnet, 
HTTP and SMTP. Using a sniffer tool allows you to 
interrogate packets in more detail to determine which 
methods the intruder is trying to use in much more detail 
than firewall or system logging alone. An additional benefit 
to sniffer tools is that they can also create and store log 
files. The log files can then be stored and used for forensic 
purposes.  
Building a Honey Pot 
There is a variety of public domain tools and software 
available that can be useful to help you setup a Honey Pot 
as well as many sites dedicated to helping guide you 
through the process. Most tools seem to have originated on 
the Unix platform, while many have been ported to 
Microsoft NT.  
 
What you will need to create or develop your own Honey 
Pot system are a minimum of the following components and 
considerable configuration time:  
• A Workstation or PC. It appears as though an 
Intel-based workstation is fine.  
• An operating system. I prefer BSD Unix or RedHat 
as there are more tools available for the UNIX 
platform than NT.  
• Sniffer package.  
 
II. COMMERCIAL HONEY POT SYSTEMS 
There are a variety of commercial Honey Pot systems 
available. The operating systems most widely supported are 
Microsoft NT and UNIX. As many of the commercial 
products have been released in the past 12 – 18 months, 
some of them are still in relatively early versions. I tried to 
find information regarding market share but wasn’t able to 
find any published statistics.  
Some of the commercial Honey Pot systems available are:  
• Network Associates, Cyber cop Sting  
• Tripwire, Tripwire.  
• Fred Cohen and Associates, Deception Toolkit. 




International Journal of Advanced Engineering, Management and Science (IJAEMS)                            [Vol-2, Issue-5, May- 2016] 
Infogain Publication (Infogainpublication.com)                                                                                                                 ISSN : 2454-1311 
www.ijaems.com                                                                                                                                                                          Page | 313  
 
III. WORKING OF HONEY POT SYSTEM 
Honey pots can also be described as being either low 
interaction or high interaction, a distinction based on the 
level of activity that the honeypot allows an attacker. A 
low-interaction system offers limited activity; in most cases, 
it works by emulating services and operating systems. The 
main advantages of low-interaction honeypots are that they 
are relatively easy to deploy and maintain and they involve 
minimal risk because an attacker never has access to a real 
operating system to harm others. 
In contrast, high-interaction honey pots involve real 
operating systems and applications, and nothing is 
emulated. By giving attackers real systems to interact with, 
organizations can learn a great deal about an attacker's 
behavior. High-interaction honeypots make no assumptions 
about how an attacker will behave, and they provide an 
environment that tracks all activity. Such conditions allow 
organizations to learn about behavior they would not 
otherwise have access to.  
High-interaction systems are also flexible, and IT security 
professionals can implement as much or as little of them as 
they want. In addition, this type of honeypot provides a 
more realistic target, capable of detecting a higher caliber of 
attacker. High-interaction honeypots can be complex to 
deploy, however, and they require additional technologies 
to prevent attackers from using the honeypot to launch 
attacks on other Systems [2].  
 
 
Fig.2: Honeyd Monitors[2] 
 
The honeyd monitors are shown in figure 2, as when an 
attacker (2) probes an unused IP, Honeyd detects the probe, 
takes over that IP via ARP spoofing, then creates a virtual 
honeypot.(3) for the attacker to interact with (Honeyd can 
create multiple virtual honeypots to fool attackers on all 
unused addresses).The attacker is fooled into thinking he is 
interacting with a successful hacked system(4).In addition, 
honeyd automatically updates its list of unused IPs as 
systems are added or removed from the network. 
• One solution being developed is the open-source 
Honeyd, which monitors unused IP space, instead of a 
single IP address. Any traffic or connection attempt 
made to an unassigned IP address is most likely 
unauthorized or illicit activity. This exponentially 
increases a honey pot’s ability to detect unauthorized 
activity. 
• When someone attempts to communicate with an 
unused IP, Honeyed--which is installed on a single 
computer--creates a virtual honeypot that interacts 
with the attacker. Honeyed also has the capability to 
detect activity on any TCP/UDP port, even if the 
connection is encrypted or uses IPv6 to tunnel traffic. 
Honey pot Farms 
While developments such as Honeyed address the 
scalability issue to some extent, honeypot farms promise to 
be a breakthrough technology. 
• In the future, organizations won't deploy honeypots on 
their networks. Instead, they'll simply deploy a 
hardware device that monitors unused IP addresses, 
similar to Honeyed, and redirects all attacker traffic to 
a single cluster of honeypots (in Figure 3). 
 
Fig.3: Schematic diagram for Honeypot farm[2] 
 
In a scenario shown in Figure 3, an external attacker (1) 
penetrates the DMZ and scans network IP addresses (2). 
The redirection appliance (3) monitors all unused addresses, 
and uses Layer 2 VPN technology to enable the firewall (4) 
to redirect the intruder to the honeypot farm (5), which may 
have honeypot computers mirroring all types of real 
network devices. Similarly, an internal attacker (6), 
scanning the network for vulnerable systems such as open 
file shares is redirected (7) by the honeypot appliance when 
he probes unused IP addesses. 
• Centralizing the hardware solves the problem of 
deploying and maintaining honeypots on the network. 
In fact, we're likely to see this offered as a service, 
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with managed security service providers (MSSPs) 
maintaining farms for clients. 
• Honeypot farms will simplify administration--all your 
honeypots will be in one location, where they can be 
monitored. For example, a major auto manufacturer 
wants to deploy honeypots on all of its networks 
around the world. That's a logistical nightmare. But 
with farms, all the honeypots are physically located at 
the company's headquarters and maintained by 
security specialists. Admin will simply deploy devices 
on the local networks to redirect unauthorized traffic 
to the farm. 
• Instead of bringing the honeypot to the attacker, 
attackers in the future will be directed to the honeypot. 
• We're already seeing this in such commercial solutions 
as NetBait. NetBait provides a service where it will 
deploy redirectors on your internal network. Attackers 
are then redirected to NetBait's honey pot farm, where 
their every action is detected and recorded. Or, if an 
organization prefers, it can maintain its own honeypot 
farm, using the NetBait solution to redirect  attackers. 
Advantages of honey pots  
Security experts say that honeypots can succeed in a 
number of areas where traditional intrusion-detection 
systems (IDS) have been found wanting. The main 
advantages are:  
• Too much data: One of the common problems with the 
traditional IDS is that it generates a huge amount of 
alerts. The sheer volume of this "noise" makes it time-
consuming, resource-intensive and costly to review the 
data. In contrast, honeypots collect data only when 
someone is interacting with them. Small data sets can 
make it easier and more cost-effective to identify and 
act on unauthorized activity. 
• False positives: Perhaps the biggest drawback of IDS 
is that so many of the alerts generated are false. False 
positives are a big problem even for organizations that 
spend a lot of time tuning their systems. If IDS 
continually creates false positives, administrators may 
eventually begin to ignore the system. Honeypots 
sidestep this problem because any activity with them 
is, by definition, unauthorized. That allows 
organizations to reduce, if not eliminate, false alerts. 
• False negatives: IDS technologies can also have 
difficulty identifying unknown attacks or behavior. 
Again, any activity with a honeypot is anomalous, 
making new or previously unknown attacks stand out. 
• Resources: An ID requires resource-intensive 
hardware to keep up with an organization's network 
traffic. As a network increases in speed and generates 
more data, the IDS have to get bigger to keep up. 
Honeypots require minimal resources, even on large 
networks. According to Lance Spitzner, founder of the 
Honey net Project, a single Pentium computer with 
128MB of RAM can be used to monitor millions of IP 
addresses. 
• Encryption: More organizations are moving to encrypt 
all their data, either because of security issues or 
regulations, such as the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act. Not surprisingly, more and 
more attackers are using encryption as well. That 
blinds an IDS's ability to monitor the network traffic. 
With a honeypot, it doesn't matter if an attacker is 
using encryption; the activity will still be captured. 
Honey pots have their advantages and disadvantages[3]. 
They are clearly a useful tool for luring and trapping 
attackers, capturing information and generating alerts when 
someone is interacting with them. The activities of attackers 
provide valuable information for analyzing their attacking 
techniques and methods. Because honeypots only capture 
and archive data and requests coming in to them, they do 
not add extra burden to existing network bandwidth.  
However, honeypots do have their drawbacks. Because they 
only track and capture activity that directly interacts with 
them, they cannot detect attacks against other systems in the 
n network. Furthermore, deploying honeypots without 
enough planning and  consideration may introduce more 
risks to an existing network, because honeypots are  
designed to be exploited, and there is always a risk of them 
being taken over by attackers,  using them as a stepping-
stone to gain entry to other systems within the network. 
This is perhaps the most controversial drawback of honey 
pots.  
How honeypots augment IDSs  
The evolution of honeypots can also be understood by 
looking at the ways these systems are being used in 
association with IDSs to prevent, detect and help respond to 
attacks. Indeed, honeypots are increasingly finding their 
place alongside network- and host-based intrusion-
protection systems[4].  
Honeypots are able to prevent attacks in several ways. The 
first is by slowing down or stopping automated attacks, 
such as worms or auto rooters[9]. These are attacks that 
randomly scan an entire network looking for vulnerable 
systems. (Honeypots use a variety of TCP tricks to put an 
attacker in a "holding pattern.") The second way is by 
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deterring human attacks. Here honeypots aim to sidetrack 
an attacker, making him devote attention to activities that 
cause neither harm nor loss while giving an organization 
time to respond and block the attack.  
As noted above, honeypots can provide early detection of 
attacks by addressing many of the problems associated with 
traditional IDSs, such as false positives and the inability to 
detect new types of attacks, or zero-day attacks. But 
increasingly, honeypots are also being used to detect insider 
attacks, which are usually more subtle and more costly than 
external attacks.  
Detection methodology 
Honey pots can fill the growing gaps which suffer from 
false positives and a lack of alert intelligence. As a result, 
we're going to see much wider deployments in the next few 
years. That's not to say honey pots will replace IDSes. Each 
technology has its strengths and limitations.  
We are already beginning to see this technology. 
Symantec's honeypot, Decoy Server, works with the 
company's IDS solution, Manhunt. Decoy Server is an 
advanced honeypot that doesn't emulate services; instead, it 
creates multiple instances of real operating systems. 
Attackers then interact with these real operating systems 
and applications. This information is fed into a central 
system, where it's combined with data from Manhunt[5]. 
Honey pots are also helping organizations respond to 
attacks. A hacked production system can be difficult to 
analyze, since it's hard to determine what normal day-to-day 
activity is and what intruder activity is. Honeypots, by 
capturing only unauthorized activity, can be effective as an 
incident-response tool because they can be taken off-line for 
analysis without affecting business operations[8]. The 
newest honeypots boast stronger threat-response 
mechanisms, including the ability to shut down systems 
based on attacker activity and frequency-based policies that 
enable security administrators to control the actions of an 
attacker in the honeypot.  
Potential issues with honey pots 
Secrecy is paramount when deploying a honey pot or honey 
net. If everyone knows it is a trap, no-one will attempt to 
attack it at all, except perhaps automated tools such as 
worms. Some honeypots, especially low interaction ones, 
may be easily identified as honeypots by an attacker due to 
their emulation of services. Any emulation of a complex 
system will always differ from the real thing; for example, 
there are a variety of ways for a program to check if it is 
running within a virtual machine and malware is 
increasingly using these techniques to hamper analysis[6]. 
There will always be an arms race between those trying to 
develop ways of detecting honeypots, and those who are 
trying to improve honeypots so they are harder to 
fingerprint. 
Client-side attack frameworks exist, such as MPack that 
contain automated mechanisms that make detection and 
analysis of malicious web servers with client honeypots 
more difficult. For example, client-side attacks might not 
trigger if the client honeypot accesses a malicious web 
server from a specific network (for example, from our 
research lab) and/or client-side attacks might only trigger 
once. Upon repeated interaction, the malicious web server 
might not launch client-side attacks anymore making 
tracking and analysis of the malicious server and its attack 
difficult. 
Another concern is that if a high interaction honeypot is 
compromised, the attacker may attempt to use this as a 
stepping stone to damage or take over other systems[7]. 
Ideally the honeypot should use several mechanisms to 
prevent this, and the operator should pay close attention so 
no harm comes to innocent third-parties. In some 
jurisdictions, legal liability for the actions of users of the 




Like all technologies, honeypots have their drawbacks, the 
greatest one being their limited field of view. Honeypots 
capture only activity that's directed against them and will 
miss attacks against other systems. For that reason, security 
experts don't recommend that these systems replace existing 
security technologies. Instead, they see honeypots as a 
complementary technology to network- and host-based 
intrusion protection. The advantages that honey pots bring 
to intrusion-protection solutions are hard to ignore, 
especially now as production honeypots are beginning to be 
deployed. In time, as deployments proliferate, honeypots 
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